Does the brain construct an efficient representation of the sensory world? We review progress on this question, focusing on a series of experiments in the last decade which use fly vision as a model system in which theory and experiment can confront each other. Although the idea of efficient representation has been productive, clearly it is incomplete since it doesn't tell us which bits of sensory information are most valuable to the organism. We argue that, in fact, an organism which maximizes the (biologically meaningful) adaptive value of its actions given fixed resources must have internal representations of the outside world that are optimal in a very specific information theoretic sense: they maximize the information about the future of sensory inputs at a fixed value of the information about their past. This principle contains as special cases computations which the brain seems to carry out, and it should be possible to test this optimization directly. We return to the fly visual system and report the results of preliminary experiments that are in very suggestive agreement with theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Shannon's original work [1] there has been the hope that information theory would provide not only a guide to the design of engineered communication systems but also a framework for understanding information processing in biological systems. One of the most concrete implementations of this idea is the proposal that computations in the brain serve to construct an efficient (perhaps even maximally efficient) representation of incoming sensory data [2] , [3] , [4] . Since efficient coding schemes are matched, at least implicitly, to the distribution of input signals, this means that what the brain computes-perhaps down to the properties of individual neurons-should be predictable from the statistical structure of the sensory world. This is a very attractive picture, and points toward general theoretical principles rather than just a set of small models for different small pieces of the brain. More precisely, this picture suggests a research program that could lead to an experimentally testable theory. In this paper we will review some progress along one branch of this program, identify some fundamental challenges that need to met if progress is to continue, and suggest some new ideas which we believe can break through these difficulties. These ideas lead to immediate suggestions for new experiments, and we describe some preliminary, encouraging results.
II. SOME RESULTS FROM THE FLY VISUAL SYSTEM
The idea of efficient representation in the brain has motivated a considerable amount of work over several decades. We begin by reviewing some of what has been done along these lines, focusing on one experimental testing ground, the motion sensitive neurons in the fly visual system.
Many animals in particular those that fly, rely on visual motion estimation to navigate through the world. The sensorymotor system responsible for this task, loosely referred to as the optomotor control loop, has been the subject of intense investigation in the fly, both in behavioral [5] and in electrophysiological studies. In particular, Bishop and Keehn [6] described wide field motion sensitive cells in the fly's lobula plate, and some neurons of this class have been directly implicated in optomotor control [7] . The fly's motion sensitive visual neurons thus are critical for behavior, and one can record the action potentials or spikes generated by individual motion sensitive cells (e.g., the cell H1, a lobula plate neuron selective for horizontal inward motion) using an extracellular tungsten microelectrode, and standard electrophysiological methods [8] ; unlike most such recordings, in the fly one can record stably and continuously for days.
The extreme stability of the H1 recordings has made this system an attractive testing ground for a wide variety of issues in neural coding and computaton. In particular, for H1 it has been possible to show that: 1) Sequences of action potentials provide large amounts of information about visual inputs, within a factor of two of the limit set by the entropy of these sequences even when we distinguish spike arrival times with millisecond resolution [9] . 2) This efficiency of coding has significant contributions from temporal patterns of spikes that provide more information than expected by adding up the information carried by individual spikes [10] . 3) Although many aspects of the neural response vary among individual flies, the efficiency of coding is nearly constant [11] . 4) Information rates and coding efficiencies are higher, and the high efficiency extends to even higher time resolution, when we deliver stimulus ensembles that more closely approximate the stimuli which flies encounter in nature [12] . 1 
5) The input/output relation of these neurons changes in
response to changes in the input distribution. For the simple case where we change the dynamic range of velocity signals, the input/output relation rescales so that the signal is encoded in relative units; the magnitude of the rescaling factor maximizes information transfer [15] . 6) In order to adjust the input/output relation reliably, the system has to collect enough samples to be sure that the input distribution has changed. In fact the speed of adaptation is close to this theoretical limit [16] . All of these results point toward the utility of efficient representation as a hypothesis guiding the design of new experiments, and perhaps even as a real theory of the neural code. So much for the good news.
III. ON THE OTHER HAND ...
Despite the successes of information theoretic approaches to the neural code in fly vision and in other systems, we must be honest and consider the fundamental stumbling blocks in any effort to use information theoretic ideas in the analysis of biological systems. First, Shannon's formulation of information theory has no place for the value or meaning of the information, 2 yet surely organisms find some bits more valuable than others. Second, it is difficult to imagine that evolution can select for abstract quantities such as the number of bits that the brain extracts from its sensory inputs. Both of these problems point away from general mathematical structures toward biological details such as the fitness or adaptive value of particular actions, the costs of particular errors, and the resources needed to carry out specific computations. It would be attractive to have a theoretical framework that is faithful to these biological details but nonetheless derives predictions from more general principles.
IV. EFFICIENT REPRESENTATION OF PREDICTIVE

INFORMATION
To develop a biologically meaningful notion of optimization, we start with the idea that there is some metric for the quality or utility of the actions taken by an organism, and that there are costs for taking these actions and for maintaining the apparatus that collects and processes the relevant sensory information. The ultimate metric is evolutionary fitness, but in more limited contexts one can think about the frequency or value of rewards and punishments, and in experiments one can manipulate these metrics directly. Costs often are measured in metabolic terms, but one also can measure the volume of neural circuitry devoted to a task; for unicellular organisms one can measure the reduction in growth rate associated with making particular cellular components [17] . Presumably there also are costs associated with the development of complex structures, although these are difficult to quantify.
Given precise definitions of utility and cost for different strategies (whether represented by neurons or by genomes), the biologically meaningful optimum is to maximize utility at fixed cost: While there may be no global answer to the question of how much an organism should spend, there is a notion that it should receive the maximum return on this investment. Thus within a given setting there is a curve that describes the maximum possible utility as a function of the cost, and this curve divides the utility/cost plane into regions that are possible and impossible for organisms to achieve. Our claim is that this curve of biologically optimal performance can be mapped into an optimization principle that involves only information theoretic quantities.
Taking actions that achieve a criterion level of fitness requires a minimum number of bits of information. Consider an experiment in which human subjects point at a target, and the reward or utility is dependent upon the positional error of the pointing. We can think of the motor neurons, muscles and kinematics of the arm together as a communication channel that transforms some central neural representation into mechanical displacements. If we had an accurate model of this communication channel we could calculate its rate-distortion function, which determines the minimum number of bits required in specifying the command to insure displacements of specified accuracy across a range of possible target locations. The rate-distortion function divides the utility/information plane into accessible and inaccessible regions.
It also is true that bits are not free. In the classical examples of communication channels, the signal-to-noise ratio (SN R) with which data can be transmitted is related directly to the power dissipation, and the SN R in turn sets the maximum number of bits that can be transmitted in a given amount of time; this is (almost) the concept of channel capacity. If we think about the bits that will be used to direct an action, then there are many costs-the cost of acquiring the information, of representing the information, and the more obvious physical costs of carrying out the resulting actions. Continuing with the example of motor control, we always can assign these costs to the symbols at the entrance to the communication channel formed by the motor neurons, muscles and arm kinematics. The channel capacity separates the information/cost plane into accessible and inaccessible regions. Ideas about metabolically efficient neural codes [18] , [19] can be seen as efforts to calculate this curve in specific models.
To complete the link between biological optimization and information theoretic ideas, we need to remember that there is a causal, time ordered path from information about the outside world to internal representations to actions. Thus the adaptive value of actions always depends on the state of the world after the internal representation has been formed, simply because it takes time to transform representations into actions; the only bits that can contribute to fitness are those which have predictive power regarding the future state of the world. In contrast, because of causality, any internal representation necessarily is built out of information about the past.
The fact that representations are built from data about the past but are useful only to the extent that they provide information about the future means that, for the organism, the bits in the rate-distortion tradeoff are bits about the future, while the bits in the channel capacity tradeoff are bits about the past. Thus the different tradeoffs we have been discussingthe biologically relevant trade between resources and adaptive value, the rate-distortion relation between adaptive value and bits, and the channel capacity trading of resources for bitsform three quadrants in a plane. The fourth quadrant, which completes the picture, is a purely information theoretic tradeoff between bits about the past and bits about the future.
Assuming that the organism lives in a statistically stationary world, predictions ultimately are limited by the statistical structure of the data that the organism collects. More concretely, if we observe a time series through a window of duration T (that is, for times −T < t ≤ 0), then to represent the data X past we have collected requires S(T ) bits, where S is the entropy, but the information that these data provide about the future X future (i.e., at times t > 0) is given by some I(X past ; X future ) ≡ I pred (T ) S(T ). In particular, while for large T the entropy S(T ) is expected to become extensive, the predictive information I pred (T ) always is subextensive [20] . Thus we expect that the data X past can be compressed significantly into some internal representation X int without losing too much of the relevant information about X future . This problem-mapping X past → X int to minimize the information I(X int ; X past ) that we keep about the past while maintaining information I(X int ; X future ) about the futureis an example of the "information bottleneck" problem [21] . Again there is a curve of optimal performance, separating the plane into allowed and forbidden regions.
We see that there are several different optimization principles, all connected. The biologically relevant principle is to maximum the fitness F given some resource cost C. But in order to take actions that achieve some mean fitness F in a potentially fluctuating environment, the organism must have an internal representation X int that provides some minimum amount of information I(X int ; X future ) about the future states of that environment; the curve I(X int ; X future ) vs. F is a version of the rate-distortion curve. Building and acting upon this internal representation, however, entails various costs, and these can all be assigned to the construction of the representation out of the (past) data as they are collected; the curve of I(X int ; X past ) vs. C is an example of the channel capacity. Finally, the information bottleneck principle tells us that there is an optimum choice of internal representation which maximizes I(X int ; X future ) at fixed I(X int ; X past ).
These arguments mean that we can derive the biological fitness vs. resources by passing through a purely information theoretic optimization. Given resources C there is a maximum possible information I max channel (C) in the organism's internal representation; if this representation is chosen correctly then there is a maximum information I max future [I channel ] available about the future, and from this information the organism can take actions with some maximum adaptive value F max [I future ]. While the relations F max [I future ] and I max channel (C) depend on myriad biological details, an organism which achieves the biological optimum must also operate at some point on the optimal curve in the plane of I(X int ; X future ) vs I(X int ; X past ). This optimum is defined by
where X past → X int is the rule for creating the internal representation and λ is a Lagrange multiplier. This is a purely information theoretic principle, which does not depend on biological details, as promised.
V. A UNIFYING PRINCIPLE?
The optimization principle in Eq (1) is very abstract; here we consider two examples. First imagine that we observe a Gaussian stochastic process [x(t)] that consists of a correlated signal [s(t)] in a background of white noise [η(t)]. Thus,
and hence the power spectrum of x(t) is given by
The full probability distribution for the function x(t) is
where Z is a normalization constant and the kernel
If we sit at t = 0, then X past ≡ x(t < 0) and X future ≡ x(t > 0). In the exponential of Eq (6) , mixing between X past and X future is confined to a term which can be written as
where
This means that the probability distribution of X future given X past depends only on x(t) as seen through the linear filter g(τ ), and hence only this filtered version of the past can contribute to X int . 3 Indeed, if we insist that X int is discrete, then it will be an adaptive quantization of the filtered past, y(t) = 0 −∞ dt g(−t)x(t). 3 The information bottleneck in the case of Gaussian distributions admits a more general discussion, in particular identifying those instances in which X int depends only on a limited set of linear projections of the input variable (Xpast in the present discussion). See Ref [22] for details.
The filter g(t) is exactly the filter that provides optimal separation between the signal s(t) and the noise η(t) [23] . Thus solving the problem of optimally representing the predictive information in this time series is exactly the problem of optimally separating signal from noise.
In contrast to these results for Gaussian time series with finite correlation times, consider what happens we look at a time series that has essentially infinitely long correlations. Specifically, consider an ensemble of possible experiments in which points x n are drawn independently and at random from the probability distribution P (x| α), where α is a Kdimensional vector of parameters specifying the distribution. At the start of each experiment these parameters are drawn from the distribution P ( α) and then fixed for all n. Thus the joint distribution for many successive observations on x on one experiment is given by
Now we can define X past ≡ {x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x N } and X future ≡ {x N +1 , x N +2 , · · · , x M }, and we can (optimistically) imagine an unbounded future, M → ∞. To find the optimal representation of predictive information in this case we need a bit more of the apparatus of the information bottleneck [21] .
It was shown in Ref [21] that an optimization problem of the form in Eq (1) can be solved by probabilistic mappings X past → X int provided that the distribution which describes this mapping obeys a self-consistent equation,
where Z is a normalization constant and D KL (X past ; X int ) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions of X future conditional on X past and X int , respectively,
Finally we have the fact that the future depends on our internal representation only because this internal representation is built from observations on the past:
which shows that Eq (10) really is a self-consistent equation for P (X int |X past ). To solve these equations it is helpful to realize that they involve integrals over many variables, since X past is N dimensional and X future is M − N dimensional. In the limit that these numbers are very large and the temperature-like parameters λ is very small, it is plausible that the relevant integrals are dominated by their saddle points.
In the saddle point approximation one can find solutions for P (X int |X past ) that have the following suggestive form. The variable X int can be thought of as a point in a Kdimensional space, and then the distribution P (X int |X past ) are Gaussian, centered on locations α est (X past ), which are the maximum a posteriori Bayesian estimates of the parameters α given the observations {x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x N }. The covariance of the Gaussian is proportional to the inverse Fisher information matrix, reflecting our certainty about α given the past data. Thus, in this case, if we solve the problem of efficiently representing predictive information, then we have solved the problem of learning the parameters of the probabilistic model that underlies the data we observe.
Signal processing and learning usually are seen as very different problems, especially from a biological point of view. Building an optimal filter to separate signal from noise is a "low-level" task, presumably solved in the very first layers of sensory processing. Learning is a higher level problem, especially if the model we are learning starts to describe objects far removed from raw sense data, and presumably happens in the cerebral cortex. Returning to the problem of placing value on information, separating signal from noise by filtering and learning the parameters of a probabilistic model seem to be very different goals and it is plausible that organisms carry out these tasks at different times and with different mechanisms because the kinds of information that one extracts in the two cases have different value to the organism. What we have shown is that this is not true. There is a single principleefficient representation of predictive information-that values all (predictive) bits equally but in some instances corresponds to filtering and in others to learning. What determines whether we should filter or learn is not an arbitrary "biological" choice of goal or assignment of value, but rather the structure of the data stream to which we have access.
VI. NEURAL CODING OF PREDICTIVE INFORMATION
It would be attractive to have a direct test of these ideas. If we record from a single neuron, then the internal representation of the world X int can be identified with a short segment of the spike train from that neuron, while X past and X future are the past and future sensory inputs, respectively. It would seem that to measure I(X int ; X future ) we would have to understand the structure of the code by which spike trains represent the future; the same problem arises even with I(X int ; X past ). In fact there is a more direct strategy [9] .
The essential idea behind direct measurements of neural information transmission [9] is to use the (ir)reproducibility of the neural response to repeated presentations of the same dynamic sensory signal. If we think of the sensory stimulus as a movie that runs from time t = 0 to t = T , we can run the movie repeatedly in a continuous loop. Then at each moment t we can look at the response R ≡ X int of the neuron, and if there are enough repetitions of the movie we can estimate the conditional distribution P (X int |t); the entropy S n (t) of this distribution measures the "noise" in the neural response. On the other hand, if we average over the time t we can estimate P (X int ), and the entropy S total of this distribution measures the capacity of the neural responses to convey information. In the limit of large T ergodicity allows us to identify averages over time with averages over the distribution out of which the stimulus movies are being drawn, and then
is the mutual information between sensory inputs and neural responses and hence (from causality 4 ) the mutual information between the internal representation and the past. More careful analysis makes clear that the strategy in Ref [9] measures the information which X int provides about whatever aspects of the sensory stimulus are being repeated. For example, if we have a movie with sound and we repeat the video but randomize the audio, we measure the information that neurons carry about their visual and not auditory inputs. Thus to measure I(X int ; X future ) we need to generate sensory stimuli that are all drawn independently from the same distribution but are constrained to lead to the same future, and then reproducible neural responses to these stimuli will reflect information about the future. For example, consider a velocity trajectory v k (t) generated on repeat k as
where ξ k (t < 0) = ξ 0 (t) for all k, while each ξ k (t > 0) is drawn independently; in the simplest case ξ(t) has no correlations in time (white noise). Then v k (t)v k (t ) ∝ exp(−|t − t |/τ c ), and all v k (t < 0) are identical. Now take the trajectories and reverse the direction of time. The result is an ensemble of trajectories that lead to the same future but are otherwise independent. This can be done for several distinct futures, and then the stimuli glued together to make a continuous loop. We have used this method to generate velocity trajectories which are delivered to the fly by physically rotating it in a natural setting, as in Ref [12] . When we look at segments of the spike train within a window of duration τ we find that I(X rmint ; X past ) depends on τ [9] . Using the "common future" stimuli described here we find that I(X int ; X future ) also depends on τ , and hence by varying the window of our analysis we can parametrically trace out the relationship between I(X rmint ; X past ) and I(X int ; X future ) that is the central quantity in our theoretical discussion. Since we know the stochastic process that generates the sensory stimuli, we can solve the optimization problem in Eq (1) and compare the results with the experimental curve of I(X int ; X future ) vs I(X rmint ; X past ). In preliminary experiments we find that, over the behaviorally relevant range τ ≤ 30 ms, the agreement between theory and experiment is very close.
